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The Priority of Racial Constituency over Descriptive
Representation
Michael Rabinder James

Bucknell University

Several normative political theorists argue for racially descriptive representation, or for blacks to represent blacks.
I contend that if theorists believe that blacks deserve additional measures to improve their substantive political
representation, then they should prioritize the creation of racial constituencies independently of whether such
constituencies elect black representatives. Prioritizing racial constituency circumvents essentialism within
descriptive representation and better reflects the role of electoral authorization and accountability in generating
trust between representatives and constituents. As a result, descriptive representation becomes one of several criteria
(along with other identity markers, ideological proximity, and general competence and trustworthiness) to be
applied by a racial constituency in selecting a preferable representative. Ultimately, prioritizing racial constituency
allows normative theorists to affirm, without philosophical contradiction, the existence of black districts that elect
nonblack representatives; contain black ideological minorities; exhibit diverse political interests; reflect shifting
electoral constituencies; and elect representatives with divergent representational styles.

B

arack Obama. Kenneth Blackwell. Deval
Patrick. Lynn Swann. Harold Ford. Michael
Steele. What do these men have in common?
They were all candidates for national or statewide
office in the United States in 2006 or 2008. Obama, of
course, ran for President; Blackwell, Patrick, and
Swann sought governorships in Ohio, Massachusetts,
and Pennsylvania respectively; Ford ran for a U.S.
Senate seat from Tennessee, while Steele pursued one
from Maryland. Most were unsuccessful: only Obama
and Patrick won their elections, but the others ran
competitive campaigns. Importantly, these men were
not from the same party: Obama, Patrick, and Ford
ran as Democrats, the rest as Republicans. More
importantly, all men are black Americans who sought
to represent constituencies that were majority white.
For this reason, it is perhaps unsurprising that only
two of these candidates won their contests. What is
notable is that none of the black Republicans managed to win a majority of the black voters in their
contests, even though all of their opponents were
white (see appendix).

These examples pose a difficult challenge for
philosophical defenders of racially descriptive representation, who argue that blacks should represent
blacks. Though hardly monolithic, these political
theorists all promote descriptive racial representation
not just for its symbolic benefits but also to enhance
the substantive representation of minority race citizens, either by promoting policies that further minority interests, or by representing a minority perspective
within legislative deliberation.1 But given these theorists’ concern for substantive representation, it is
notable that they have devoted relatively little attention
to defending the creation of majority-black constituencies, whether or not they elect black representatives.
Jane Mansbridge (1999), Suzanne Dovi (2002), and
Iris Young (1990, 2000) do not discuss the value of
minority racial constituencies; Melissa Williams does,
but only as a means for electing and holding accountable black representatives (1998, 173). Remarkably,
Andrew Rehfeld, whose excellent book concerns and
is titled The Concept of Constituency, defends black
descriptive representation but rejects even Williams’

1

See Phillips (1995), Williams (1998), Mansbridge (1999), Young (2000), Dovi (2002, 2007), and Rehfeld (2005). Only Mansbridge
(1999, 648–52) defends descriptive representation for its dual symbolic benefits of supporting the de facto legitimacy of the political
system and countering the perception that marginalized groups lack the ability to govern. However, even she acknowledges that the
‘‘primary function of representative democracy is to represent the interests of the represented’’ (630).
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 3, July 2011, Pp. 899–914
Ó Southern Political Science Association, 2011
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instrumental use of majority-black constituencies to
authorize and hold accountable descriptive representatives (2005, 231–39). As a result, racial constituencies
have not been defended independently of the racial
identity of the representative.2
I wish to rectify this lacuna. I contend that
if theorists believe that blacks deserve additional
measures to improve their substantive political representation, then they should prioritize the creation of
racial constituencies independently of whether such
constituencies elect black representatives.3 Instead of
immediately addressing the question of who represents,
I suggest first attending to who authorizes and holds
accountable. Thus far, theorists have seen descriptive representation as a necessary condition for representational
fairness, albeit an insufficient condition absent electoral
mechanisms for authorizing and holding accountable
descriptive representatives (Williams 1998, 6). On
the contrary, I suggest that wherever representatives
are subject to electoral authorization and accountability, theorists should view racial constituencies as the
necessary albeit insufficient condition for representational fairness.
If we take this step, then whether a black constituency chooses to elect a black representative becomes a more contingent political question, wherein
black voters weigh the relative value of descriptive
similarity against other criteria such as political ideology, competence, or trustworthiness. Making such a
political decision depends less on philosophical arguments than on the specific characteristics of the present
slate of candidates and the specific concerns of the
constituency in question. Thus, I wish to make minority racial constituencies the primary concern. If
such constituencies elect descriptive representatives,
this may generate potentially real benefits, but these
are secondary to the ability of the minority racial
constituency to authorize and hold accountable its
representative, whether or not she is of the same race.
My argument proceeds in three steps. I first argue
that theorists of racially descriptive representation do
not resolve two conundrums: they fail to avoid racial
essentialism through their idea of shared racial perspective, and they misunderstand the relationship
between electoral accountability and the trust that
black voters are expected to have for their descriptive

representatives. Both of these problems can be circumvented if we prioritize minority racial constituency.
I then clarify my thesis by defining racial constituency,
specifying what I mean by substantive representation,
explaining why racial constituencies deserve priority
over descriptive representation, and relate my argument
to the ‘‘selection’’ model of representation. Finally,
I outline the specific advantages of prioritizing black
racial constituency, which I contend allows normative
theorists to affirm, without philosophical contradiction,
the existence of black districts that elect nonblack
representatives; contain black ideological minorities;
exhibit diverse political interests; reflect shifting electoral constituencies; and elect representatives with
divergent representational styles. I conclude by emphasizing that this argument applies only to settings where
representatives are subject to electoral authorization
and accountability. This condition will, I argue, affect
the applicability of this argument to other disadvantaged intergenerational groups, such as Latinos and
Native Americans.4

The Philosophical Conundrums of
Descriptive Representation
Perspective, Interest, and Essentialism
Phillips notes that descriptive representation must
provide constituents with some additional ‘‘guarantee,’’ beyond mere electoral accountability, that the
representative will act on their behalf. Yet she fears
that specifying this guarantee may flirt with essentialist ‘‘notions of authentic or organic representation’’
(1995, 157). Similarly, Williams contends that defenders of descriptive representation ‘‘must adduce
something that members of these groups share without falling into the trap of essentialism’’ (1998, 5–6).
Mansbridge defines essentialism as ‘‘the assumption
that members of certain groups have an essential
identity that all members of that group share and of
which no others can partake’’ (1999, 637; emphasis
added). But given the ‘‘wide diversity of both opinion
and interest within any social grouping’’ (Williams
1998, 6), what could all and only all members of a
4

2

The sole exception among political theorists is the brief
discussion by Kymlicka (1995, 148).
3
I posit that blacks do deserve additional help in securing their
substantive political representation but cannot defend this
position here. Williams (1998, Chap. 6) most strongly justifies
enhancing black representation, by arguing that contemporary
black disadvantage is caused by their historical oppression.

For analytical clarity, I will focus only on the representation of
African Americans within the existing single-member plurality
system used for the U.S. House of Representatives. I do not
examine gender based representation. As Mala Htun (2004)
demonstrates, the wider distribution of women across political
parties, versus the concentration of racial or ethnic voters within
certain parties, renders the institutional strategies for enhancing
representational fairness across these two groups incommensurable.
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priority of racial constituency
racial group share, in fact rather than by assumption,
such that a white representative cannot provide that
extra, nonelectoral guarantee? The answer proffered
by Mansbridge, Williams, and Young is a shared social
perspective.
All three theorists ground shared social perspective in common experiences. Williams states that
members of marginalized groups share ‘‘the experience of marginalization and the distinctive perspective on matters of public policy that comes from that
experience’’ (1998, 6); Young asserts that members of
disadvantaged social groups possess a ‘‘particular
location-relative experience . . .or point of view on
social processes’’ (2000, 136; Cf. 97–98, 123); and
Mansbridge depicts the ‘‘visible characteristics’’
shared by descriptive representatives and their constituents as ‘‘the outward signs of . . .shared experience’’ (1999, 647). Common experience and shared
perspective thus unifies the group amidst its internal
diversity of interests or opinions. Indeed, for Young a
social group perspective provides the initial common
ground upon which individuals develop their diverse
opinions and interests (2000, 137).5 Blacks need not
share interests or opinions nevertheless to start from
the same social perspective that should be descriptively
represented. Since white representatives lack these
experiences, they cannot represent the perspective of
black constituents. Although white representatives
could, through learning, overcome this experiential
and epistemological gulf, they cannot erase the effects
of their own privileged perspective, leaving them at
some distance from their constituents. On the other
hand, because a descriptive ‘‘representative and his or
her constituents are ‘similarly situated’’’ and share
group-specific experiences, she can ‘‘communicate the
constituents’ distinctive perspective on matters of
public policy’’ (Williams 1998, 139).
However, Young admits that if a social group can
encompass diverse opinions and interests, it might also
encompass diverse perspectives: ‘‘One might object that
the idea of an African American perspective . . .is just
as open to criticism as the idea of a single group
interest or opinion’’ (Young 2000, 138). Later she
concludes that there ‘‘are good grounds for questioning an assumption that a social perspective is unified’’
(2000, 148). Young’s rejoinder is first to warn against
retreating to an individualist stance that denies group
5

Williams more strongly claims ‘‘that a group’s shared perspective helps to define the boundaries within which different
interpretations of interest are possible’’ (1998, 171). But this
position is less tenable, since it specifies a determinate boundary
of black interests, which the turn to perspective was meant to
avoid.
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difference. She later recommends that we ‘‘pluralize’’
group descriptive representation: ‘‘the perspective of
women in a commission or legislative body would be
better [represented] by . . .a small committee of women
rather than just one woman’’ (2000, 148). But Young’s
response is unconvincing, since a ‘‘small committee of
women’’ still assumes a shared ‘‘perspective of women’’
that presumably excludes men.
In the end, theorists of descriptive representation
must define a set of experiences that are shared
among all and only all members of a group that
grounds the common social perspective that can only
be represented descriptively. But none of these
theorists empirically identify what these experiences
might be for any specific social group. Looking at
race, we might ask if the ‘‘black experience’’ is
universally shared among all members of this group,
or whether some individuals possess different experiences not typical of the group. Do all members of a
social group share all experiences, or do some
members share some experiences while others share
other experiences? Is there an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ of experiences shared by members of the same
social group? Certainly most blacks cite frequent
experiences of racism, such as having difficulty hailing
cabs or being watched in stores. But there are always
outliers, like the black, anti-affirmative-action activist
Ward Connerly, who claims to have experienced
racism only once in his life, and uses that experience
to emphasize the benevolence of whites, citing the
friend who defended him on that occasion (Bearak
1997). Does Connerly thus lack an authentic black
perspective? Connerly thinks not, and any political
theorist who suggests otherwise edges back to the
essentialist position that Phillips warned of earlier.
There is no purely philosophical solution to this
puzzle; it must be answered empirically, by investigating which experiences all and only all members
of a social group share. However, such universally
shared experiences are quite rare, if they exist at all.
In 2008, 24.7% of blacks lived in poverty, while
54.4% of black children were raised in single family
households. For whites, the respective proportions
were 8.6% and 19.6% (Census Poverty 2008; Census
Families 2008). Although more blacks than whites were
affected by poverty and single parenthood, nevertheless
all blacks do not share this experience, while some
whites do. At best, the experiences that ground social
group perspective are probabilistic (Taylor 2004, 86). It
is not that all and only all blacks will share certain experiences, which in turn ground a shared perspective;
rather, blacks are more likely to share certain experiences than are whites.
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But the probability of sharing interests and
opinions, as expressed by voting preferences, seems
to be higher than the probability of sharing experiences. In the last three Presidential elections, 88–95%
of blacks voted for the Democratic candidate (see
appendix). A black American is far more likely to
vote Democratic than to grow up in a single-parent
household, let alone be poor, a victim of a violent
crime, or a prisoner. While similar experiences certainly influence black political preferences, the diversity of perspective-generating experiences remains
greater than the diversity of party preferences. Indeed, the same experiential statistics meant to ground
racial perspective are used by empirical political
scientists to identify common black interests (Canon
1999, 21–31; Haynie 2001, 19–24; Swain 1993, 5–13).
Recall that most blacks did not support Michael
Steele, Kenneth Blackwell, and Lynn Swann. Theorists of descriptive representation might adopt the
language of probability to depict these black Republicans as outliers regarding black experiences and
perspectives (See Williams 1998, 6). But most black
representatives might be outliers, since like their
white counterparts they are typically richer and more
educated than their constituents, black or white, and
thus can enjoy ‘‘status deracialization’’ and circumvent the negative experiences suffered by poor or
working class blacks (Dovi 2002, 740). But we can
avoid dismissing some black perspectives as inauthentic by straightforwardly claiming that blacks
widely but not universally share certain common
interests, which most Republican politicians, black or
white, do not defend.
On a statistically significant, probabilistic basis,
most if not all blacks have common interests and
opinions. But the language of probability undermines
arguments for descriptive representation, since its defenders must adduce some factor shared by all and only
all blacks in order to show why blacks cannot be
adequately represented by nonblacks, and the factor
that they adduce—a shared social perspective grounded
in common experience—does not encompass all and
only all blacks. Instead of resigning ourselves, like
Mansbridge, to the uncomfortable admission that essentialism may be an unavoidable ‘‘cost’’ associated with
descriptive representation (1999, 637), we can simply
circumvent this problem by defending race-conscious
districting through the concept of racial constituency.
The concept of racial constituency avoids essentialism by easily accommodating the fact that what
blacks share is not universal and exclusive to the
group but only statistically significant and probabilistic. For a racial constituency will include hundreds

of thousands of black constituents (n . 329,000)6,
unlike the unitary sample size of a descriptive
representative (n51). This allows defenders of racial
constituencies to avoid the need to identify some
elusive factor, such as experience or perspective,
shared by all and only all blacks. Rather, it will
merely require that most blacks in any specific district
share a variety of commonalities, be they partisan
preferences, interests, opinions, experiences, or perspectives. In this way a racial constituency is no more
essentialist than any other large electoral constituency. Just as a majority-rural district will contain at
least some city slickers who do not share the party
preferences, interests, opinions, experiences, or perspectives typical of most country folk, so too a
majority-black district will have at least some black
constituents who are outliers in these respects. As a
result, a majority-black electoral district can form as
coherent a community of interest (and opinion,
experience, and perspective), with at least as strong
a claim to representation, as any other constituency.
Theorists of descriptive representation set up a false
dichotomy between affirming the existence of a common racial perspective shared by all and only all blacks
versus retreating to individualistic, color-blind politics.
But the problem of experiential outliers does not
suggest that race is politically unimportant or that black
constituents lack race-related interests that deserve
representation. Outliers become a problem only when
we ground descriptive representation on the notion of a
universally shared racial group perspective. If social
group perspective remains a problematic concept, the
solution is not color-blindness but a shift in theoretical
emphasis from descriptive representation to racial
constituency. Focusing on racial constituency still allows
voters in a majority-black district to choose to elect a
black representative, but it has no problem accepting
their decision to elect a nonblack candidate who might
better reflect their interests and opinions (and maybe
even their experiences and perspectives). Pace Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, creating a majority-black district does not suggest ‘‘that members of the same racial
group . . .think alike’’ (Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630). But
assuming that a black representative shares the same
perspective as his black constituents does.

6
I derive this number by multiplying the size of an average
constituency (700,000 after the upcoming 2010 Census and
reapportionment) by the 47% number that Cameron, Epstein,
and O’Halloran (1996) suggest is the optimal black percentage
for Southern districts, where majority-black districts create the
greatest trade-offs in terms of the substantive collective representation of black interests.
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Trust and Accountability
Theorists additionally argue that limits to electoral
accountability generate a need for descriptive representation in order to provide a supplementary source
of trust between representatives and constituents. For
Phillips, descriptively based trust compensates for the
autonomy that representatives enjoy within legislative
deliberation; for Williams, descriptive similarity helps
to ensure that representatives are equally affected by
the laws they pass. Both arguments are partially
supported by empirical analysis but still suffer important shortcomings.
For Phillips, descriptive representation seems to
contradict the idea of accountability, since a representative cannot really be held to account for her
identity. Voters can throw out a representative who
breaks her campaign promises, but they cannot sanction a representative for no longer being black.
Phillips also asserts that majority-black seats are typically safely Democratic, making it hard for constituents
to dismiss representatives in a general election (1995,
101–103). But Phillips fails to mention that most seats
in the American House of Representatives are safe seats,
regardless of whether or not they are majority-minority.
Indeed, the 2008 elections saw voters in majority-black
districts in Maryland and Louisiana unseat unresponsive
black legislators through primary and general election
challenges, whereas a notoriously corrupt incumbent in
the majority-white, at-large Alaska seat managed to stay
in office. Moreover, it is possible that a politicized racial
identity may well be subject to some form of electoral
accountability, a point to which I will return momentarily. For now, let us examine Phillips’ justification
for descriptive representation in the context of legislative deliberation.
Because legislative deliberation requires that representatives enjoy some autonomy to revise their preferences in light of new arguments and information that
emerge within the assembly, descriptive similarity
provides constituents with an additional reason to trust
representatives who reverse their campaign positions.
As Phillips puts it, ‘‘If the representatives were only
messengers, sent there to pass on pre-agreed programmes and ideas, then it might seem rather beside
the point to worry about how many of them are female
or Latino or black. But if the representatives are to
claim considerable autonomy, we will more legitimately
worry about how much of our experience they share’’
(1995, 159). And because legislative deliberation is ‘‘not
normally conceived on the model of industrial relations,
where the negotiators break off discussion in order to
consult with their members,’’ descriptive representation
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becomes doubly important (1995, 155). Finally, representatives enjoy greater autonomy on precisely those
issues where the minority racial group’s interests and
preferences are in flux. Where preferences are crystallized, she admits, majority-black districts could hold
their representatives accountable, regardless of their racial identity (1995, 159; Cf. Mansbridge 1999, 643–48).
So when representatives act more as delegates, electoral
accountability is more important than descriptive
representation; but whenever representatives act as
trustees, descriptive representation provides an additional and necessary source of trust beyond electoral
accountability.
Congress scholar Richard Fenno seems to confirm this argument in his portrait of Representative
Louis Stokes of Ohio, who asserted: ‘‘I have freedom
to do almost anything I want to do in Congress and it
won’t affect me a bit at home . . .My people didn’t
send me to Washington to check back every time
there is a vote to see what public opinion in my
district says. They sent me down there to use my
judgment and to provide some leadership . . .When I
vote my conscience as a black man, I vote right for
my district’’ (Fenno 2003, 32). So although Stokes’s
legislative voting record closely matched the liberal
policy preferences of his district, he understood his
actions not as a delegate but as a trustee, free to act
as he saw fit in service of what he perceived to be his
constituents’ interests. Yet Stokes’s self-portrait might
be misleading. As Fenno points out, Stokes embodied
not a ‘‘static’’ form of racially descriptive representation but a dynamic form of symbolic representation
(2003, 5). By comporting himself ‘‘in such a way that
members of the black community would be proud of
him and—because he was descriptively like them—
proud of themselves as well,’’ Fenno concludes that
‘‘Congressman Stokes was providing something less
than substantive representation and something more
than descriptive representation. He was providing
active symbolic representation’’ (2003, 35–36).
Fenno emphasizes that ‘‘no white member of
Congress could duplicate [such pride] among his or her
black constituents—however satisfactory that white
member’s policy connections might be’’ (2003, 36).
However, I suspect that not just any black representative
could do so either. Only a black representative who
acted in an exemplary way could generate the pride that
Stokes invoked among his constituents. Consider
former Louisiana Congressman William Jefferson,
who invoked his descriptive similarity to his black
constituents in order to depict his indictment for
corruption as part of a conspiracy against black
representatives. His constituents dismissed his claim
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and turned him out of office in favor of an Asian
Republican, Ahn Cao. Instead of symbolic pride, if
anything Jefferson probably invoked symbolic shame.
The counterpoised examples of Stokes and
Jefferson reinforce the importance of black racial
constituencies. Pace Phillips, a descriptive representative can be held accountable for her racial identity
if, like Jefferson, she actively invokes symbolic shame.
But such accountability presumes facing reelection
before a predominantly black constituency. Moreover, formal electoral accountability remains indispensable even for a successful descriptive trustee like
Stokes, since even trusteeship’s greatest advocate,
Edmund Burke, saw elections as the basis of legitimate
representation (Pitkin 1967, 177–81). So a descriptive
trustee like Stokes might not have to check back
constantly with his constituents, but his trusteeship
must still be electorally validated by his majority-black
district. Finally, only a district with a large black
majority will provide a secure home for a representative, like Stokes, who seeks to provide active symbolic
representation of the black community. A district with
a smaller black majority or plurality cannot easily
facilitate such active symbolic representation and will
more likely elect a representative who balances black
and nonblack interests (Canon 1999). How different
racial constituencies facilitate different types of representational styles, even among black representatives, is
occluded by theorists who focus only on descriptive
representation while overlooking the details of racial
constituency. In sum, Phillips’s insights about descriptive representation ineluctably return us to the formal
mechanism of electoral accountability to a majorityblack constituency. And this formal mechanism can
equally apply to a nondescriptive representative, albeit
for the more substantive issue of whether she is
defending black interests.
I will revisit these points later. Now let us turn to
Williams, who begins by noting two proxies for trust
within America’s ‘‘Madisonian’’ scheme of government. First, representatives are accountable to their
constituents through frequent and periodic elections;
thus, trust in representative virtue is replaced by the
incentive for reelection. Second, because representatives are subject to the laws that they pass, they will
not enact unnecessary burdens upon their constituents. Williams argues that both Madisonian proxies
for trust are undermined by interracial mistrust, the
effects of which can only be obviated by black descriptive representation.
Focusing on the Reconstruction era, Williams
argues that electoral accountability failed to secure
black interests. White Republicans initially protected

black interests in civil rights during the early Reconstruction, a period in which resentment or disenfranchisement led most southern whites not to vote.
But as white southerners returned to the ballot, after
the removal of their disqualifications and the soothing of their resentment, competition for their votes
led white Republicans to soften their support for
black civil rights (1998, 167). This historical account,
however, favors prioritizing racial constituency over
descriptive representation, since the white Republicans altered their legislative behavior to accommodate the changing racial demographics of their voting
electorate. Indeed, the numerical dominance of white
voters would have even undermined the capacity of
black representatives to protect black interests, since
they would have been accountable to white voters.
Williams herself provides evidence of this very problem, citing a black newspaper editorial criticizing
white Republican attempts to control the Louisiana
candidate slate, since even if they ‘‘chose black
representatives, ‘the latter, if so selected [will not]
express the sentiments of their race’’’ (1998, 164).
White-dominated constituencies were the main problem, even if they elected black representatives.
Williams’s second argument fares somewhat better. Because they were not themselves subject to the
racially discriminatory laws introduced in Reconstruction-era Southern states, ‘‘white Republicans’
own rights did not depend on the passage of
legislation such as Sumner’s Civil Rights Bill and
the Enforcement Act of 1875,’’ depriving them of the
incentive to pass these federal antidiscriminatory
measures (1998, 167). As a result, black citizens
rightly came to mistrust their white representatives
and the white-dominated government.
Williams sees descriptive representation as a tonic
to such distrust. While Jim Crow laws are a thing of
the past, facially neutral laws, such as the harsher
sentences for possessing crack versus powder cocaine,
can have extreme, race-differentiated results. Thus,
black citizens can expect to trust black representatives
to protect their interests, at least where those interests
conflict with the interests of the white majority (1998,
169). Beyond this, Williams follows Mansbridge’s
suggestion that black constituents will feel more
comfortable contacting black representatives, thereby
providing an additional source of nonelectoral trust
(Williams 1998, 172; Cf. Mansbridge 1999). Over the
longer term, Williams speculates that the trust that
develops between descriptive representatives and their
constituents will generate a ‘‘spiral of trust’’ that
enhances blacks’ general trust in government as a
whole (1998, 172).
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All three of Williams’ hypotheses have been empirically tested. Gay (2002, 729–30) and Tate (2003,
124, 160–61) undermine the last claim, finding that
blacks represented by blacks are no more likely than
blacks represented by whites to trust government in
general. Conversely, Gay (2002, 726) confirms the
second hypothesis: black voters are more likely to
contact black rather than white representatives. Most
difficult to assess is the first claim, since extant studies
do not test specifically for ‘‘trust’’ but more generally
for positive or negative evaluations of descriptive
representatives. Nevertheless, this evidence is at best
mixed. Tate (2003, 121–22) finds that black voters
more positively evaluate black representatives, but
party identity may be the driving factor. Gay (2002,
721–25), in turn, finds that descriptive representation
seems to matter more to white constituents than to
black constituents, whose own higher approval of black
representatives seems to reflect ideological affinity
more than racial similarity.
So why don’t black voters place greater trust in
black representatives? Perhaps because black representatives, like most legislators, disproportionately
come from the upper or middle classes (Dovi 2002,
740). Thus, many black representatives might not be
harmed by laws cutting education or health care
funding, even if these cuts devastate poorer black
constituents. As far as this is true, it deflates the
argument that descriptive similarity enhances constituents’ trust in their representatives. So it is unsurprising that Williams ultimately concedes, ‘‘Trust in a
representative is not justified by his or her mere similarity to oneself. In addition, there must be mechanisms of accountability to bind the representative to
constituents’ interests’’ (1998, 173). I agree but would
reverse the emphasis. Black constituencies are needed
to authorize and hold accountable representatives; in
addition, black constituents might better trust such
representatives if they share the same racial identity.

Prioritizing Racial Constituency
I define a racial constituency as an electoral district
within which blacks are sufficiently numerous so as
initially to authorize and subsequently to hold accountable their representative, whether or not she
herself is black. I define authorization as a constituency’s use of an election to grant authority to a
representative ‘‘at the outset of his term of office,’’
and accountability as a constituency’s use of an
election to subject an already authorized representative ‘‘to reelection or removal at the end of his term’’

905
(Pitkin 1967, 56). Thus, a racial constituency is one in
which the representative (1) needs the decisive support of black voters in order first to be authorized to
serve in the House of Representatives and (2) can
later be sanctioned by black voters should he betray
their interests. This definition requires that blacks
at minimum constitute the pivotal vote in a district;
thus a racial constituency need not be majority-black,
unless that is the only way of placing black voters in
the pivotal electoral position. I will leave it up to
empirical political scientists to determine the exact
percentage of black registered voters needed to
generate pivotal voting strength within a specific
district, as this will vary according to region, urban
density, the presence of Latino voters, and the racial
ideology of white constituents. For instance, in a
northeastern urban district, a black minority allied
with liberal whites might be able to exercise decisive
power in authorizing and holding accountable a
representative; conversely, in a southern rural district,
blacks might need a majority in order to outvote
conservative whites (See Epstein and O’Halloran
1999; Lublin 1997, 1999). For present purposes, the
key point is that a black racial constituency is one in
which the representative (1) needs the decisive support of black voters in order first to be authorized to
serve in the House of Representatives and (2) can
later be sanctioned by black voters should she betray
their interests.
Prioritizing racial constituency on substantive
grounds requires distinguishing dyadic versus collective forms of representation. Dyadic representation
concerns the representation of a specific constituency, whereas collective representation reflects the
overall representativeness of the entire legislative
body. Substantive, descriptive, and symbolic representation may be achieved dyadically or collectively:
substantive collective representation concerns the policies created by an entire legislative body, whereas
substantive dyadic representation pertains to the positions taken (e.g., roll-call votes or bills sponsored)
by the representative of a specific constituency; descriptive collective representation compares the demographics of the legislature with that of the nation,
while descriptive dyadic representation reflects the
descriptive similarity between a representative and
her specific constituency (e.g., a black representative
serving a black constituency); finally, symbolic representation may be collective (with the legislature as a
whole in some way symbolizing the nation) or dyadic
(with the representative in some way symbolizing his
constituency). All of these forms of representation are
variants of ‘‘group’’ representation, since all political
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representation is of groups (Htun 2004, 441; Burden
2007, 60–61; Mansbridge 1999, 230–33).
My argument centers on substantive dyadic representation, or on how well specific representatives
further the interests of their specific racial constituency. In doing so, I follow most normative and
empirical scholars of racially descriptive representation, who devote their attention to the legislative
actions (roll-call votes, bill sponsorship) of individual
representatives (See Canon 1999; Haynie 2001; Swain
1993; Tate 2001, 2003; Whitby 1998; Williams 1998,
170). Two approaches buck this trend. First are
empirical scholars who try to assess whether the creation of racial constituencies actually furthers the
substantive collective representation of blacks, as measured by the policies produced by the legislature as a
whole. Second is the idea of ‘‘surrogate representation,’’ whereby black representatives from some
constituencies seek to represent the interests and
perspective of blacks from other constituencies or
the entire nation (Fenno 2003, 7; Mansbridge 1999,
642; Mansbridge 2003, 522–25). However, neither of
these exceptions undermines my argument about the
relationship between racial constituency and substantive black representation.
First, there is some empirical evidence that
creating racial constituencies may harm black substantive collective representation by rendering the
neighboring districts whiter and more conservative,
thus increasing the overall number of Republican
representatives who are unlikely to support black
interests. However, this trade off diminishes in the
North (where black constituencies typically abut
liberal, urban white districts likely to elect racially
liberal Democratic representatives), whereas in the
South the optimal district for the collective substantive
representation seems to be 47% black, a proportion
likely to place black voters in the pivotal electoral
position that defines racial constituency (Cameron,
Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Epstein and O’Halloran
1999; Lublin 1997, 1999).
Second, it is true that surrogate descriptive representatives are not subject to dyadic electoral authorization and accountability by the entire range of blacks
whom they seek to represent (Mansbridge 2003, 524).
But as I will argue below, black surrogate representatives face dyadic accountability to their own districts,
which unsurprisingly tend to have large minority populations, whose interests and perspectives are likely to
mirror those of blacks outside of the district. Districts
in which blacks constitute only a small majority or a
plurality are less capable of providing a safe seat from
which surrogate representatives can promote extra-

district racial interests, and thus more typically elect
representatives who balance black and white interests.
Thus my argument about the dyadic substantive benefits of racial constituency is likely to hold regardless
of the importance of collective substantive or surrogate representation.
In defending the priority of racial constituency
over descriptive representation, I do not deny that the
latter really can enhance both the substantive and
symbolic representation of racial minorities (Cf.
Canon 1999; Haynie 2001; Mansbridge 1999). I am,
however, suggesting that it should be up to the
members of a racial constituency to determine whether
or not they wish to be represented by a descriptive
representative. In her cogent defense of ‘‘preferable’’
descriptive representation, Dovi (2002, 741) correctly
argues that the ‘‘choice between two descriptive
representatives’’ depends upon adopting and applying
criteria that identify which one would be preferable.
However, Dovi unnecessarily constrains the choice to
be only between descriptive representatives because she
takes ‘‘the value of having descriptive representatives
in public positions as a given’’ (729), and because she
extends her model of preferable representation to
nonelectoral settings, where ‘‘members of historically
disadvantaged groups are not always the ones who
select descriptive representatives’’ (734).
My argument departs from Dovi on both of these
points. I argue that racial constituency is prior to
descriptive representation precisely where members
of historically disadvantaged groups are the ones who
select the representative. Whenever blacks are at least
the pivotal voting bloc, if not the majority, within a
given constituency, then it is up to them to adopt and
apply criteria of preferable representation in choosing
among descriptive or nondescriptive representatives.
And instead of assuming a priori that a black
constituency should favor a black representative as
a necessary if not sufficient condition for adequate
substantive representation, I hold that a black constituency should be free to adopt and apply criteria of
preferable representation, which might lead them to
favor a white representative over a black one.
Having a racial constituency adopt and apply
criteria for preferable representation gains importance
if we examine the ‘‘selection’’ model of representation.
Because empirical evidence suggests that voters are less
adept at sanctioning a representative post hoc for betraying their interests than at selecting ex ante a good
representative likely to defend their interests, this
model claims that constituents can secure better
substantive representation by initially selecting a representative who ‘‘has self-motivated, exogenous
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reasons’’ for upholding their interests (Mansbridge
2009, 369). Although Mansbridge (2009, 384–86)
suggests that the selection model embodies an alternative form of deliberative or narrative accountability,
wherein the representative gives an account of any
actions that contradict the wishes of the constituents,
she ultimately admits that true accountability can
never dispose of post hoc sanctions. Thus, the selection
model’s greatest significance is as a robust portrait of
authorization, one that goes beyond the formal electoral process in order to depict the types of considerations that voters should incorporate in initially
choosing a specific representative.
Because the selection model advises constituents
to select representatives who are similar to them,
Mansbridge emphasizes descriptive representation
as a criterion for preferable representation (2009,
380–81). However, Burden’s account of the selection
model broadens the scope of similarity and advises
voters ‘‘to choose candidates who are ‘like them’ on
as wide a variety of dimensions as possible’’ (2007,
141). Thus, constituents should consider various
identity criteria in addition to race, such as gender,
party affiliation, political ideology, and personal
background. Finally, Brennan and Hamlin (1999,
124) expand the criteria of selection beyond traits
of similarity to include markers of general competence and trustworthiness. Combining these three
approaches generates a multifaceted selection model
of representation that bolsters the argument for the
priority of racial constituency, since it allows black
voters to weigh racial similarity against other criteria
in selecting representatives.
Recall that I do not reject descriptive representation as substantively unimportant. My point is that
the potential benefits of descriptive representation are
real but subordinate to the need to create racial
constituencies within which black voters have decisive electoral power and thus can weigh the criterion
of racial similarity versus different criteria, such as
other identity traits, ideological proximity, or general
competence and trustworthiness. Theorists of descriptive representation have trouble explaining why
black voters would prefer a white Democrat to a
black Republican, thereby allowing critics to undermine their arguments for majority-black districts by
citing examples like Michael Steele or Kenneth Blackwell. Defending race-conscious districting through
racial constituency avoids this, by attributing to black
constituents the freedom and capacity to weigh the
value of racial similarity against other criteria in
selecting their representative. Depending on the candidate pool, different criteria will gain importance.
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Imagine black voters in a majority-black district
considering the factors of racial similarity and political ideology. If the choice is between a racially
conservative white Republican and a racially liberal
black Democrat, choosing the descriptive representative will be obvious. But when faced with a racially
liberal white Democrat (e.g., Steve Cohen) versus a
racially conservative black Republican (e.g., J. C.
Watt), black voters may understandably lower the
value they place on racially descriptive representation. Now add general trustworthiness to the other
two factors. In this situation, black voters may
reasonably sacrifice both racial similarity and political
ideology if a black liberal candidate has, through past
behavior, demonstrated a clear lack of trustworthiness. This scenario nicely models the aforementioned
decision of the majority-black and Democratic 2nd
District of Louisiana to replace the indicted black
Democrat William Jefferson with the Asian Republican Ahn Cao.

The Specific Advantages of
Prioritizing Racial Constituency
Nonblack Representatives
Perhaps the most obvious advantage of prioritizing
racial constituency over descriptive representation is
that advocates of race-conscious districting need not
devalue the status of white or other nonblack representatives elected from predominantly black districts.
Although such districts overwhelmingly tend to elect
black representatives (Handley and Grofman 1994;
Whitby 1998, 92), some do elect nonblack representatives, such as former representatives Lindy Boggs and
Peter Rodino (Swain 1995, 170–88), along with current
representatives Steve Cohen, Robert Brady, and the
aforementioned Ahn Cao.
In each of the contemporary cases, predominantly
black constituencies have weighed racial similarity
against other criteria in ultimately choosing a nondescriptive representative. Cao’s election illustrates
how a black constituency can weigh descriptive and
ideological similarity against general trustworthiness in
selecting a representative. That Cao was the lone
House Republican to support the health care reform
bill in 2009 also shows how being accountable to a
black constituency can shape representational behavior, a point I will revisit. But Cao’s partisan and racial
identity eventually cut short his Congressional career
in 2010 (Roll Call, LA 2). A sharp contrast in terms of
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job security is Brady, who represents one of two
majority-minority districts in Philadelphia. Remarkably, Brady’s 2007–2008 scores from such civil rights
organizations as the Leadership Council for Civil
Rights (LCCR) and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) are each
five points higher than those of his black counterpart,
Chaka Fattah of the neighboring Second District. For
this reason it is unsurprising that Brady faced no 2010
primary challenger, black or white, since black voters
have selected someone who matches up well in terms
of party, ideology, trustworthiness, and competence,
despite his dissimilarity in terms of race (Project Vote
Smart, Fatah 2009; Project Vote Smart, Brady 2009).
My argument gains further support from the case of
Cohen, who represents the majority-black and heavily
Democratic 9th District of Tennessee. His LCCR and
the NAACP ratings consistently equal or exceed those
of black representatives from predominantly black districts (Project Vote Smart, Cohen 2009). And though
Cohen’s initial election in 2006 was facilitated by a
highly fractured Democratic primary contested by
over a dozen candidates, all but Cohen being black,
in 2008 and again in 2010 Cohen overwhelmingly
defeated single black primary challengers who emphasized the need for black descriptive representation (CQ
Politics, TN 9; NY Times Primary Results). In the end,
black voters found Cohen’s strong substantive representation of their interests to be a more significant
criterion for preferable representation than racially
descriptive similarity.
These cases confirm Swain’s (1995, 189, 211–16)
contention that nonblack representatives can represent black interests. Yet substantial scholarship suggests this to be more likely if these representatives are
authorized by and accountable to a predominantly
black constituency. Statistical analysis demonstrates
that increasing a district’s black percentage strongly
and consistently correlates with increasing the racial
liberalism of black and white representatives (Grose
2005, 432–35). Testing for the effect of racial demographics on the legislative behavior of representatives, Whitby finds that ‘‘for each gain of 1 percent
black as a consequence of redistricting, LCCR scores
increase by 1.018 percentage points’’ (1998, 129;
Cf. 120–31). Using alternative measures, Canon (1999)
shows that increasing the black percentage of a district
correlates with a greater number of race-related speeches
made by a representative (191), race-related bills cosponsored by a representative (197), race-related stories
involving the representative in the district’s media (236),
and even blacks pictured in a representative’s newsletter
(221). Finally, Sharpe and Garand show that increasing

the black population of a district by 10% or more
strongly correlates with a large increase in the racial
liberalism of a representative’s legislative voting (2001,
42, 44). Thus, the racial demographics of a district
strongly affect a representative’s behavior, leading to
noticeable differences even among black representatives.

Internal Minorities
Prioritizing racial constituency over descriptive representation also helps to mitigate the criticism that
racial redistricting ignores the fact that members of
the same race do not all share the same interests,
opinions, experiences, or perspectives. Recall that
defenders of descriptive representation introduce
the concept of racial perspective in order to provide
something more broadly shared among blacks than
interests or opinions, so as to identify what a black
representative adds that a nonblack representative,
even if elected by a majority black constituency,
cannot. In effect, a common racial perspective was
meant to unify all and only all blacks, despite their
diverse interests and opinions. But if a common racial perspective is grounded in common experiences,
the problem is that not all blacks can be expected to
have had the same experiences. Although it is clear
that blacks are much more likely than whites to have
had certain experiences, this likelihood falls far short
of universality, and in fact blacks are more likely to
share interests and opinions, as expressed by political
party preferences, than the experiences that are meant
to ground a common racial perspective.
But even interests, opinions, or political preferences are not universal, and precisely for this reason it
is advantageous to prioritize minority racial constituency over racially descriptive representation, since a
racial constituency is no more internally diverse, and
no less a community of interest, than a district based
on geography, class, economic sector, political subdivision, or geometric compactness. All electoral
constituencies based on fixed geographic or jurisdictional boundaries will contain internal minorities
who lose out in the process of voting. Little or no
political controversy attaches to the fact that the state
of New York has two Democratic Senators, even
though a minority of at least 30% would prefer
Republicans (and would presumably have opposing
interests or opinions). Similarly uncontroversial are
the House’s geographic districts, which also contain
internal minorities with opposing interests, even when
a lack of electoral competition allows one candidate to
gain 100% of the vote. So the presence of a minority of
blacks with interests or opinions that differ from the
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majority of their racial group should not trouble us. In
the end, the fact that a large majority of blacks share
common interests and opinions, combined with the
fact that they share a long history of state-sanctioned
oppression, strongly justifies their claim to constitute a
distinct political constituency that deserves to be
protected in the redistricting process. This holds
regardless of the existence of a minority of blacks with
opposing interests, regardless of whether the district is
geometrically compact, and regardless of whether or
not it elects a black representative.

Diversity of Constituencies
Yet if we probe further into the idea of black interests,
we find that levels of diversity of interests within the
community vary with the issues at stake. Working
with data from the 1992 and 1994 National Election
Surveys (NES), David Canon shows that racial differences in public opinion vary according to three types
of issues. Regarding explicitly racial issues, such as
affirmative action, the government’s role in promoting racial integration, and civil rights progress, blacks
are much more liberal than whites. Regarding facially
neutral but implicitly racial issues, such as welfare,
food stamps, the death penalty, and urban unrest,
black and white opinion diverges less, with whites
leaning conservative and blacks being moderate. On
nonracial issues such as health care, taxes and the
deficit, abortion, gay rights, free trade, and defense
spending, Canon finds no racial differences whatsoever, with perfectly identical mean scores and
similar distributions along the ideological spectrum
(1999, 27–30).
The diversity of black opinion on nonracial issues
derives from differences in class, region, and geography. Rich and upper middle-class blacks tend to
have different economic interests from poor and
working class blacks, while among poor or working
blacks, southern rural voters are much more conservative than northern urban ones on social issues,
particularly gun control (Canon 1999, 25–26; Tate
2003, 88). The combination of intrablack differences
on nonracial issues with interracial differences on
racial and implicitly racial issues reinforces the
advantages of shifting our focus from descriptive
representation to minority racial constituency.
Canon notes many black representatives elected
from post-1990 majority-black southern districts are
noticeably more conservative than their northern
black counterparts (1999, 150). This stems partly
from the greater conservatism of rural southern
blacks and partly from the large percentage of
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conservative southern whites in these districts. For
although the Supreme Court has pilloried these
districts as reflecting ‘‘political Apartheid,’’ they are
actually far more racially heterogeneous than most
other districts, including the overwhelmingly black
districts in northern urban centers. So while representatives of northern black districts are extremely
and consistently liberal, many representatives of post1990 southern districts adopt a ‘‘balancing’’ strategy,
strongly protecting black racial interests while leaning
conservative on nonracial issues favored by their
white and black rural constituents (Canon 1999, 48).
A typical ‘‘balancing’’ representative is Sanford
Bishop, a black Democrat from the 2nd District of
Georgia, a rural constituency that is 44% black and
50% non-Hispanic white. On black racial issues,
Sanford is strongly liberal, but on nonracial social issues
he tacks sharply to the right, garnering him strong
ratings from the American Conservative Union and
weak ratings from organizations advocating for Muslims and for gays and lesbians (Project Vote Smart,
Bishop 2009; Almanac, Bishop 2010). Instead of attributing Bishop’s opposition to gay marriage or tepid
support for Muslim rights to his black perspective, we
can better explain this by the conservatism of his
southern, rural, and racially mixed district.

The Dynamics of Racial Constituency
Thus far, my portrait of racial constituency has been
a bit simplistic. By discussing the racial demographics
of a given district, I have only examined objective
constituency, defined as ‘‘the legal grouping of citizens
into geographic, occupational, or group-based electoral rolls’’ (James 2004, 151). Although the U.S.
forms its objective constituencies through geographic
districts, some countries provide a separate electoral
roll for disadvantaged groups, such as the Maori in
New Zealand (Kymlicka 1995, 147–48), or for workers and management in different economic sectors
(Grady 1993). More radically, Rehfeld (2005) argues
for random, permanent objective constituencies that
are entirely divorced from geographic or other communities of interest. Within the American system, the
important characteristics of objective constituency include not only geographic boundaries but also the
constituents’ social and political traits, such as race,
gender, income or production class, partisan affiliation,
and ideological character.
While objective constituency is crucially important, it must be augmented by the idea of subjective
constituency, defined as the voluntary formation of
cohesive voting blocs through interaction between
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voters and candidates (James 2004, 151). Subjective
constituency is most salient when comparing different electoral systems: proportional or semiproportional electoral systems with large multimember
districts typically allow voters to coalesce voluntarily
across a wide geographic territory in order to elect
their preferred candidate (Guinier 1994). However,
subjective constituency plays a role even within single
member districts. Most clearly, competition among
more than two candidates facilitates subjective constituency, since a group that constitutes less than a
majority can elect the winner (Reilly 1997). Yet even
with only two candidates, voters and candidates can
still exercise agency in order to form a constituency.
Saward (2006) emphasizes the entrepreneurial role of
candidates who ‘‘claim’’ to represent a certain constituency, which can freely accept or reject this bid;
conversely, Bishen (2000) posits that a ‘‘prospective
constituency’’ must already exist before a politician can
seek to represent them. In a similar vein, Fenno (2003)
and Canon (1999) show how voters and candidates
interact in forming subjective racial constituencies.
Fenno emphasizes the agency of representatives,
who understand themselves as acting for a set of
concentric constituencies: the largest is the objective
constituency of the entire district, containing ‘‘all the
residents of the legally prescribed geographic constituency’’; smaller is ‘‘the reelection constituency. . .all voters who support or might support the
member’’; and the smallest is ‘‘the primary constituency . . .their most active and most reliable supporters.’’ In addition, Fenno claims that many black
representatives perceive a fourth constituency, ‘‘a national constituency of black citizens who live beyond
the borders of any one member’s district, but with
whom all black members share a set of race-related
concerns’’ (2003, 7). In this way, black representatives
provide ‘‘surrogate representation’’ for blacks outside
of their districts (Mansbridge 1999, 2003).
Canon also focuses on the ‘‘supply side’’ (candidates) rather than on the demand side (constituency
demographics) in analyzing elections in recently created
black districts. Whenever two or more black candidates
contest the Democratic primary election in a district
that is at least 30% black, Canon proffers (and generally
verifies) the following hypotheses. (1) If two black candidates compete, the more moderate candidate seeking
the support of a biracial subjective constituency will
defeat the more extreme one courting only a black subjective constituency. (2) But if two black candidates and
a white candidate run, the moderate black candidate
will lose, since the biracial subjective constituency will
have been split; the more extreme black candidate will

win if there is a runoff election; while the white
candidate might win if there is no runoff, but only if
the black vote is deeply split (Canon 1999, 126–30). In
this way, Canon can explain why two districts with
similar racial demographics in Georgia managed to elect
two very different black candidates: the very liberal
Cynthia McKinney and the very moderate Sanford
Bishop (1999, 139). It also explains Steve Cohen’s initial
election in 2006, seven years after Canon published his
study (Almanac, Cohen 2010).
Still, the emphasis that Fenno and Canon place
on subjective constituency does not overcome the
dominant role of objective constituency. Canon’s
supply side theory of subjective constituency only
works if the objective constituency is at least 30%
black, and Fenno’s black representatives can serve as
surrogate representatives of a national black constituency only if their own district’s black population
provides a sufficiently large reelection constituency.
Forming subjective constituencies through interactions between candidates and voters is more important under single-member district elections than one
might think, but in the end a candidate can define her
own constituency in this system only within favorable
objective constituencies.

Representational Styles
Different types of majority-black constituencies will
likely elect different types of representatives. Districts
with overwhelmingly large black majorities are more
likely to elect representatives who are on the extreme
end of racial liberalism; districts with narrow black
majorities, particularly those in the rural South that
include a substantial number of conservative white
voters, are more likely, depending upon the candidate
pool in the primary election, to elect more moderate
representatives who seek to balance white and black
interests. Although some defenders of minority representation might argue that the former representatives
will better advocate for the needs of the black community, the latter set of representatives can perhaps
uniquely foster interracial legislative deliberation (or
bargaining) through their acquaintance with the interests and opinions of both white and black constituents.
But Phillips warns: ‘‘The good deliberator is not
necessarily the best of advocates, for the more we try
to enter into other people’s positions or adapt our
arguments to what they will find persuasive, the more
we may detach ourselves from the community whose
interests we initially shared’’ (1995, 162). This may
be true. But as Phillips also recognizes, ‘‘democracies
need advocates as well as deliberators’’ (1995, 162).
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At times we need representatives who can understand
competing racial interests and either deliberatively
reconcile or aggregatively balance them; at other times,
we will need advocates who will intransigently protect
minority racial interests. But whereas theorists of
descriptive representation cannot find specific ways
of generating both types of representatives and must
hope that different descriptive representatives will
adopt complementary representational styles, my focus on racial constituency, in conjunction with Canon’s supply side theory, suggests that different types of
majority-black districts will produce different types of
representatives. Districts with large white minorities,
especially in the rural South, will more likely produce
good deliberators or bargainers; districts with negligible white populations will more likely produce tough
advocates. Proponents of minority voting rights must
then determine the balance of types of districts they
want to create, so as to encourage the best mix of
advocates and deliberators/bargainers.

Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued that if blacks deserve
additional measures to improve their substantive
political representation, then normative theorists
should prioritize the creation of racial constituencies
over descriptive representation. Prioritizing racial
constituency circumvents essentialism, by obviating
the need to find some trait, such as a common racial
perspective, that is shared by all and only all blacks
and thus must be represented descriptively. It also
reflects the fact that authorization by and accountability to a racial constituency is a necessary condition
for generating trust in a descriptive or nondescriptive
representative. Without dismissing the potential benefits of descriptive representation, I argue that a racial
constituency should remain free to weigh racial similarity against other criteria, such as different identity
traits, ideological proximity, or general competence
and trustworthiness, in selecting a preferable representative. As a result, descriptive representation
becomes a contingent good, one whose value must be
assessed by a racial constituency in light of the specific
concerns and the specific slate of candidates it confronts. Ultimately, prioritizing racial constituency
allows normative theorists to affirm, without philosophical contradiction, the existence of black districts
that elect nonblack representatives; contain black
ideological minorities; exhibit diverse political interests; reflect shifting electoral constituencies; and elect
representatives with divergent representational styles.
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I emphasize that the priority of racial constituency over descriptive representation holds wherever
representatives are subject to electoral authorization
and accountability by a racial constituency. Wherever
this condition cannot be satisfied, enhancing minority representation may require descriptive representation without racial constituency. This will most
likely apply to groups that are insufficiently large to
form a constituency within which they possess pivotal
voting strength and to institutions in which representation is not secured through election.
The first limit is more likely to face smaller
minority groups, such as Native Americans, as
opposed to larger groups, such as Latinos. Indeed,
my argument seems at least as applicable to Latinos
as to blacks. First of all, Latinos have surpassed blacks
as the largest racial or ethnic minority in the United
States. Even though presently their political participation trails their demographic numbers, they are
still sufficiently numerous as to constitute the pivotal
voting bloc in a large number of electoral districts. In
addition, the internal diversity of Latinos, who hail
from a variety of nations, may be of any racial group
and include native born and naturalized citizens,
along with legal and undocumented immigrants,
underminines the likelihood of finding common
experiences and a shared social perspective exclusive
to members of the group. Of course, this does not
negate the fact that many Latinos do share similar
experiences and perspectives, along with overlapping
interests, opinions, and partisan preferences. But
because these similarities are not universal, theorists
best avoid essentialism by prioritizing the creation of
Latino constituencies over descriptive representation,
especially since in many districts Latinos will gain
pivotal voting strength only in alliance with blacks,
rendering the election of a black representative as
likely as the election of a Latino one.
Conversely, Native Americans are rarely numerous
enough to constitute the pivotal voting bloc within a
House district. Thus, the formation of ethnic constituencies cannot viably enhance their substantive representation. That said, alternative approaches—such as
reserved legislative seats—seems neither politically
viable in the United States (outside of Maine’s
legislative assembly) nor theoretically defensible if
these descriptive representatives are authorized by
and held accountable to a predominantly white constituency, as India’s experience with reserved seats for
low caste representatives bears out (see Williams 1998,
209; James 2004, 161–67).
However, representation occurs not only in
elected legislative institutions but also in various
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nonelected positions, be these the innovative citizen
assemblies promoted by deliberative democrats or
more familiar institutions like the judiciary and the
executive administration. In these nonelected institutions, where a racial or ethnic constituency cannot
authorize or hold accountable a representative, descriptive representation may gain importance. Citizen
assemblies, to the degree that they address issues that
will have racially disparate outcomes, and to the
degree that their legitimacy depends on their resemblance to the citizenry as a whole (Brown 2006, 217–
21), could benefit from descriptive representation,
either to defend minority interests that conflict with
the majority, or to represent minority perspectives
within deliberation about the common good. And
while judicial offices are meant not to represent
interests but to judge impartially, the inclusion of
minority racial or ethnic perspectives is important if
‘‘we see the pursuit of impartiality as depending on
gathering the views from everywhere’’ (Phillips 1995,
187). Finally, appointments to the executive cabinet
or the agencies below it, while meant to execute the
law impartially, also embody quasi-legislative, rulemaking powers, thus justifying the inclusion of
minority interests and perspectives.
However, the reemergence of the language of
racial perspective brings up the problems that I have
discussed earlier: individual members of racial minorities may be more likely to have had the experiences that generate a shared racial perspective, but
that does not guarantee that the chosen representative will possess a perspective typical of the group
meant to be represented (Brown 2006, 218–19). Once
again, the probabilistic character of racial perspective
kicks in, although the appointer can hedge her bets
through careful research on the appointee’s background. But there is no need for such reliance on
probability or background checks when thinking of
elected positions, since a majority-minority constituency can contain a sufficient number of black or
Latino voters with overlapping interests, opinions, and
perspectives to authorize and hold accountable the
representative they have elected, regardless of his race.

Appendix. Exit Polls
1.

Maryland Senate (2006)

Blacks
Whites

Ben Cardin (D)

Michael Steele (R)

74%
48%

25%
50%

http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006//pages/results/states/MD/
S/01/epolls.0.html

2.

Ohio Governor (2006)

Blacks
Whites

Ted Strickland (D)

Kenneth Blackwell (R)

77%
58%

20%
40%

http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/OH/
G/00/epolls.0.html

3.

Pennsylvania Governor (2006)

Blacks
Whites

Ed Rendell (D)

Lynn Swann (R)

87%
57%

13%
43%

http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/PA/
G/00/epolls.0.html

4.

Massachusetts Governor (2006)

Blacks
Whites

Deval
Patrick (D)

Kerry
Healey (R)

Christy
Mihos (I)

89%
51%

11%
39%

*
8%

http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/MA/
G/00/epolls.0.html

5.

U.S. President (2000)

Blacks
Whites

Al Gore (D)

George W. Bush (R)

90%
43%

9%
54%

http://www.pollingreport.com/2000.htm#EXIT
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6.

U.S. President (2004)

Blacks
Whites

John Kerry (D)

George W. Bush (R)

88%
41%

11%
58%

http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/
00/epolls.0.html
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U.S. President (2008)

Blacks
Whites

Barack Obama (D)

John McCain (R)

95%
43%

4%
55%

http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1
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